Extractability, or "knowledge," assumptions have recently gained popularity in the cryptographic community, leading to the study of primitives such as extractable one-way functions, extractable hash functions, succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (SNARKs), and differing-inputs obfuscation (diO), and spurring the development of a wide spectrum of new applications relying on these primitives. For most of these applications, it is required that the extractability assumption holds even in the presence of attackers receiving some auxiliary information that is sampled from some fixed efficiently computable distribution Z.
• SNARKs for NP w.r.t. auxiliary input Z do not exist, or
• diO for a distribution of N C 1 circuits and aux input specified by D does not exist.
To achieve our results, we develop a "succinct punctured program" technique, mirroring the powerful punctured program technique of Sahai and Waters (STOC'14) , and present several other applications of this new technique.
We additionally demonstrate that diO w.r.t. any distribution D of programs and boundedlength auxiliary input is directly implied by any obfuscator that satisfies the weaker indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) security notion and diO for a slightly modified distribution D of programs (of slightly greater size) and no auxiliary input. As a consequence, we directly obtain negative results for diO in the absence of auxiliary input.
Introduction
Extractability Assumptions. Extractability, or "knowledge," assumptions (such as the "knowledgeof-exponent" assumption), have recently gained in popularity, leading to the study of primitives such as extractable one-way functions, extractable hash-functions, SNARKs (succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge), and differing-inputs obfuscation:
• Extractable OWF: An extractable family of one-way (resp. collision-resistant) functions [Dam91, HT98, CD09] , is a family of one-way (resp. collision-resistant) functions {f i } such that any attacker who outputs an element y in the range of a randomly chosen function f i given the index i must "know" a pre-image x of y (i.e., f i (x) = y). This is formalized by requiring for every adversary A, the existence of an "extractor" E that (with overwhelming probability) given the view of A outputs a pre-image x whenever A outputs an element y in the range of the function. For example, the "knowledge-of-exponent" assumption of Damgard [Dam91] stipulates the existence of a particular such extractable one-way function.
• SNARKs: Succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (SNARKs) [Mic94, Val08, BCCT12] are communication-efficient (i.e., "short" or "succinct") arguments for NP with the property that if a prover generates an accepting (short) proof, it must "know" a corresponding (potentially long) witness for the statement proved, and this witness can be efficiently "extracted" out from the prover.
• Differing-inputs obfuscation: [BGI + 12, BCP14, ABG + 13] A differing-inputs obfuscator O for a class of programs C is an efficient procedure which ensures if any efficient attacker A can distinguish obfuscations O(C 1 ) and O(C 2 ) of any two programs C 1 , C 2 in the class C, then it must "know" an input x such that C 1 (x) = C 2 (x), and this input can be efficiently "extracted" (as above) from A.
The above primitives have proven extremely useful in constructing cryptographic tools for which instantiations under complexity-theoretic hardness assumptions are not known (e.g., [HT98, BCCT12, GLR11, DFH12, BCP14, ABG + 13]).
Extraction with (Distribution-Specific) Auxiliary Input. In all of these applications, we require a notion of an auxiliary-input extractable one-way function [HT98, CD09] , where both the attacker and the extractor may receive an auxiliary input. The strongest formulation requires extractability in the presence of an arbitrary auxiliary input. Yet, as informally discussed already in the original work by Hada and Tanaka [HT98] , extractability w.r.t. an arbitrary auxiliary input is an "overly strong" (or in the language of [HT98] , "unreasonable") assumption. Indeed, a recent result of Bitansky, Canetti, Rosen and Paneth [BCPR14] (formalizing earlier intuitions from [HT98, BCCT12] ) demonstrates that assuming the existence of indistinguishability obfuscators for the class of polynomial-size circuits 1 there cannot exist auxiliary-input extractable one-way functions that remain secure for an arbitrary auxiliary input. However, for most of the above applications, we actually do not require extractability to hold w.r.t. an arbitrary auxiliary input. Rather, as proposed by Bitansky et al [BCCT12, BCCT13] , it often suffices to consider extractability with respect to specific distributions Z of auxiliary input. 2 More precisely, it would suffice to show that for every desired output length (·) and distribution Z there exists a function family F Z (which, in particular, may be tailored for Z) such that F Z is a family of extractable one-way (or collision-resistant) functions {0, 1} k → {0, 1} (k) with respect to Z. In fact, for some of these results (e.g., [BCCT12, BCCT13] ), it suffices to just assume that extraction works for just for the uniform distribution.
In contrast, the result of [BCPR14] can be interpreted as saying that (assuming iO), there do not exist extractable one-way functions with respect to every distribution of auxiliary input: That is, for every candidate extractable one-way function family F, there exists some distribution Z F of auxiliary input that breaks it.
Our Results. In this paper, we show limitations of extractability primitives with respect to distribution-specific auxiliary input (assuming the existence of collision-resistant hash functions). Our main result shows a conflict between differing-inputs obfuscation for Turing machines [BCP14, ABG + 13] and extractable one-way functions. Theorem 1.1 (Main Theorem -Informal). Assume the existence of collision-resistant hash functions. Then for every polynomial , there exist efficiently computable distributions Z, D such that one of the following two primitives does not exist:
• extractable one-way functions {0, 1} k → {0, 1} (k) w.r.t. auxiliary input from Z. • differing-inputs obfuscation for distribution D of Turing machines and auxiliary inputs.
By combining our main theorem with results from [BCCT12] and [BCP14] , we obtain the following corollary: Theorem 1.2 (Informal). Assume the existence of fully homomorphic encryption with decryption in N C 1 . 3 Then there exist efficiently computable distributions Z, D such that one of the following two primitives does not exist:
• SNARKs w.r.t. auxiliary input from Z. • differing-inputs obfuscation for distribution D of N C 1 circuits and auxiliary inputs.
To prove our results, we develop a new proof technique, which we refer to as the "succinct punctured program" technique, extending the "punctured program" paradigm of Sahai and Waters [SW14] ; see Section 1.1 for more details. This technique has several other interesting applications, as we discuss in Section 1.3.
As a final contribution, we demonstrate that even in the absence of auxiliary input, care must be taken when making use of extractability assumptions. Specifically, we show that differing-inputs obfuscation (diO) for any distribution D of programs and bounded-length auxiliary inputs, is directly implied by any obfuscator that satisfies a weaker indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) security notion (which is not an extractability assumption) and diO security for a related distribution D of programs (of slightly greater size) which does not contain auxiliary input. Thus, negative results ruling out existence of diO with bounded-length auxiliary input directly imply negative results for diO in a setting without auxiliary input. Theorem 1.3 (Informal). Let D be a distribution over pairs of programs and -bounded auxiliary input information P × P × {0, 1} . There exists diO with respect to D if there exists an obfuscator satisfying iO in addition to diO with respect to a modified distribution D over P × P for slightly enriched program class P , and no auxiliary input.
As a consequence, diO for the distributions D in our theorems above can be directly replaced by iO plus diO for modified distributions D of programs that remain within the respective classes (i.e., T M or N C 1 ), but no longer include auxiliary input.
Our transformation further applies to a recent result of Garg et al. [GGHW14] , which shows that based on a new assumption (pertaining to special-purpose obfuscation of Turing machines) generalpurpose diO w.r.t. auxiliary input cannot exist, by constructing a distribution over circuits and bounded-length auxiliary inputs for which no obfuscator can be diO-secure. Our resulting conclusion is that, assuming such special-purpose obfuscation exists, then general-purpose diO cannot exist, even in the absence of auxiliary input.
Interpretation of Our Results. Our results suggest that one must take care when making extractability assumptions, even in the presence of specific distributions of auxiliary inputs, and in certain cases even in the absence of auxiliary input. In particular, we must develop a way to distinguish "good" distributions of instances and auxiliary inputs (for which extractability assumptions may make sense) and "bad" ones (for which extractability assumptions are unlikely to hold). As mentioned above, for some applications of extractability assumptions, it in fact suffices to consider a particularly simple distribution of auxiliary inputs-namely the uniform distribution. 4 We emphasize that our results do not present any limitations of extractable one-way functions in the presence of uniform auxiliary input, and as such, this still seems like a plausible assumption at this point.
Comparison to [GGHW14] . An interesting subsequent 5 work of Garg et al. [GGHW13, GGHW14] contains a related study of differing-inputs obfuscation. In [GGHW14] , the authors propose a new "special-purpose" circuit obfuscation assumption, and demonstrate based on this assumption an auxiliary input distribution (whose size grows with the desired circuit size of circuits to be obfuscated) for which general-purpose diO cannot exist. Using similar techniques of hashing and obfuscating Turing machines as in the current work, they further conclude that if the new obfuscation assumption holds also for Turing machines, then the "bad" auxiliary input distribution can have bounded length (irrespective of the circuit size).
Garg et al. [GGHW14] show the "special-purpose" obfuscation assumption is a falsifiable assumption (in the sense of [Nao03] ) and is implied by virtual black-box obfuscation for the relevant restricted class of programs, but plausibility of the notion in relation to other primitives is otherwise unknown. In contrast, our results provide a direct relation between existing, studied topics (namely, diO, EOWFs, and SNARKs). Even in the case that the special-purpose obfuscation assumption does hold, our primary results provide conclusions for diO with natural "lightweight" auxiliary input distributions (e.g., descriptions of a collision-resistant hash function), whereas the auxiliary input considered in [GGHW14] is somewhat unlikely to occur naturally, itself consisting of an obfuscated program.
And, utilizing our final observation (which occurred subsequent to [GGHW14] ), we show that based on their same special-purpose obfuscation assumption for Turing machines, we can in fact rule out general-purpose diO for circuits even in the absence of auxiliary input.
Proof Techniques
To explain our techniques, let us first explain earlier arguments against the plausibility of extractable one-way functions with auxiliary input. For simplicity of notation, we focus on extractable one-way function over {0, 1} k → {0, 1} k (as opposed to over {0, 1} k → {0, 1} (k) for some polynomial ), but emphasize that the approach described directly extends to the more general setting.
Early Intuitions. As mentioned above, already the original work of Hada and Tanaka [HT98] , which introduced auxiliary input extractable one-way functions (EOWFs) (for the specific case of exponentiation), argued the "unreasonableness" of such functions, reasoning informally that the auxiliary input could contain a program that evaluates the function, and thus a corresponding extractor must be able to "reverse-engineer" any such program. Bitansky et al [BCCT12] made this idea more explicit: Given some candidate EOWF family F, consider the distribution Z F over auxiliary input formed by "obfuscating" a program Π s (·) for uniformly chosen s, where Π s (·) takes as input a function index e from the alleged EOWF family F = {f i }, applies a pseudorandom function (PRF) with hardcoded seed s to the index i, and then outputs the evaluation f i (PRF s (i)). Now, consider an attacker A who, given an index i, simply runs the obfuscated program to obtain a "random" point in the range of f i . If it were possible to obfuscate Π s in a "virtual black-box (VBB)" way (as in [BGI + 12] ), then it easily follows that any extractor E for this particular attacker A can invert f i . Intuitively, the VBB-obfuscated program hides the PRF seed s (revealing, in essence, only black-box access to Π s ), and so if E can successfully invert f i on A's output f i (PRF s (i)) on a pseudorandom input PRF s (i), he must also be able to invert for a truly random input. Formally, given an index i and a random point y in the image of f i , we can "program" the output of Π s (i) to simply be y, and thus E will be forced to invert y.
The problem with this argument is that (as shown by Barak et al [BGI + 12] ), for large classes of functions VBB program obfuscation simply does not exist.
The Work of [BCPR14] and the "Punctured Program" Paradigm of [SW14] . Intriguingly, Bitansky, Canetti, Rosen and Paneth [BCPR14] show that by using a particular PRF and instead relying on indistinguishability obfuscation, the above argument still applies! To do so, they rely on the powerful "punctured-program" paradigm of Sahai and Waters [SW14] (and the closely related work of Hohenberger, Sahai and Waters [HSW14] on "instantiating random oracles"). Roughly speaking, the punctured program paradigm shows that if we use indistinguishability obfuscation to obfuscate a (function of) a special kind of "puncturable" PRF 6 [BW13, BGI14, KPTZ13], we can still "program" the output of the program on one input (which was used in [SW14, HSW14] to show various applications of indistinguishability obfuscation). Bitansky et al. [BCPR14] show that by using this approach, then from any alleged extractor E we can construct a one-way function inverter Inv by "programming" the output of the program Π s at the input i with the challenge value y. More explicitly, mirroring [SW14, HSW14] , they consider a hybrid experiment where E is executed with fake (but indistinguishable) auxiliary input, formed by obfuscating a "punctured" variant Π s i,y of the program Π s that contains an i-punctured PRF seed s * (enabling evaluation of PRF s (j) for any j = i) and directly outputs the hardcoded value y := f i (PRF s (i)) on input i: indistinguishability of this auxiliary input follows by the security of indistinguishability obfuscation since the programs Π s i,y and Π s are equivalent when y = f i (PRF s (i)) = Π s (i). In a second hybrid experiment, the "correct" hardcoded value y is replaced by a random evaluation f i (u) for uniform u; here, indistinguishability of the auxiliary inputs follows directly by the security of the punctured PRF. Finally, by indistinguishability of the three distributions of auxiliary input in the three experiments, it must be that E can extract an inverse to y with non-negligible probability in each hybrid; but, in the final experiment this implies the ability to invert a random evaluation, breaking one-wayness of the EOWF.
The Problem: Dependence on F. Note that in the above approach, the auxiliary input distribution is selected as a function of the family F = {f j } of (alleged) extractable one-way functions. Indeed, the obfuscated program Π s must be able to evaluate f j given j. One may attempt to mitigate this situation by instead obfuscating a universal circuit that takes as input both F and the index j, and appropriately evaluates f j . But here still the size of the universal circuit must be greater than the running time of f j , and thus such an auxiliary input distribution would only rule out EOWFs with a-priori bounded running time. This does not suffice for what we aim to achieve: in particular, it still leaves open the possibility that for every distribution of auxiliary inputs, there may exist a family of extractable one-way functions that remains secure for that particular auxiliary input distribution (although the running time of the extractable one-way function needs to be greater than the length of the auxiliary input).
A First Idea: Using Turing Machine Obfuscators. At first sight, it would appear this problem could be solved if we could obfuscate Turing machines. Namely, by obfuscating a universal Turing machine in the place of a universal circuit in the construction above, the resulting program Π s would depend only on the size of the PRF seed s, and not on the runtime of f j ∈ F . Indeed, recently [BCP14] showed candidate constructions of obfuscators for Turing machines, based on the existence of differing-inputs obfuscators for N C 1 , fully homomorphic encryption with decryption in N C 1 , and succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (SNARKs).
But there is a catch. To rely on the punctured program paradigm, we must be able to obfuscate the program Π s in such a way that the result is indistinguishable from an obfuscation of a related "punctured" program Π s i,y ; in particular, the size of the obfuscation must be at least as large as |Π s i,y |. Whereas the size of Π s is now bounded by a polynomial in the size of the PRF seed s, the description of this punctured program must specify a punctured input i (corresponding to an index of the candidate EOWF F) and hardcoded output value y, and hence must grow with the size of F. We thus run into a similar wall: even with obfuscation of Turing machines, the resulting auxiliary input distribution Z would only rule out EOWF with a-priori bounded index length.
Our "Succinct Punctured Program" Technique. To deal with this issue, we develop a "succinct punctured program" technique. That is, we show how to make the size of the obfuscation be independent of the length of the input, while still retaining its usability as an obfuscator. The idea is two-fold: First, we modify the program Π s to hash the input to the PRF, using a collision-resistant hash function h. That is, we now consider a program Π h,s (j) = f j (P RF s (h(j))). Second, we make use of differing-inputs obfuscation, as opposed to just indistinguishability obfuscation. Specifically, our constructed auxiliary input distribution Z will sample a uniform s and a random hash function h (from some appropriate collection of collision-resistant hash functions) and then output a differing-inputs obfuscation of Π h,s .
To prove that this "universal" distribution Z over auxiliary input breaks all alleged extractable one-way functions over {0, 1} k → {0, 1} k , we define a one-way function inverter Inv just as before, except that we now feed the EOWF extractor E the obfuscation of the "punctured" variant Π h,s i,y which contains a PRF seed punctured at point h(i). The program Π h,s i,y proceeds just as Π h,s except on all inputs j such that h(j) is equal to this special value h(i); for those inputs it simply outputs the hardcoded value y. (Note that the index i is no longer needed to specify the function Π h,s i,yrather, just its hash h(i)-but is included for notational convenience). As before, consider a hybrid experiment where y is selected as y := Π h,s (i).
Whereas before the punctured program was equivalent to the original, and thus indistinguishability of auxiliary inputs in the different experiments followed by the definition of indistinguishability obfuscation, here it is no longer the case that if y = Π h,s (i), then Π h,s i,y is equivalent to Π h,s -in fact, they may differ on many points. More precisely, the programs may differ in all points j such that h(j) = h(i), but j = i (since f j and f i may differ on the input P RF s (h(i))). Thus, we can no longer rely on indistinguishability obfuscation to provide indistinguishability of these two hybrids.
We resolve this issue by relying differing-inputs obfuscation instead of just indistinguishability obfuscation. Intuitively, if obfuscations of Π h,s and Π h,s i,y can be distinguished when y is set to Π h,s (i), then we can efficiently recover some input j where the two programs differ. But, by construction, this must be some point j for which h(j) = h(i) (or else the two program are the same), and j = i (since we chose the hardcoded value y = Π h,s (i) to be consistent with Π h,s on input i. Thus, if the obfuscations can be distinguished, we can find a collision in h, contradicting its collision resistance.
To formalize this argument, we require a notion of differing-inputs obfuscation with auxiliary input. As it turns out, we only require extractability to hold with respect to the distribution that samples a random hash function h from the CRHF family. We have thus achieved our goal of demonstrating two distributions Z, D such that either extractable one-way functions {0, 1} k → {0, 1} k do not exist w.r.t. Z, or differing-inputs obfuscators do not exists w.r.t. D. Finally, note that assuming the existence public-coin collision-resistant hash functions [HR04] , then the auxiliary input portion of D can be uniform.
Removing Auxiliary Input in diO
We then turn our focus to differing-inputs obfuscation. We observe that in the case of diO, the situation of "bad side information" cannot be circumvented simply by disallowing auxiliary input, but rather such information can appear in the input-output behavior of the programs to be obfuscated. Namely, we show that for any distribution D over P × P × {0, 1} of programs P and boundedlength auxiliary input, the existence of diO w.r.t. D is directly implied by the existence of any indistinguishability obfuscator (iO) that is diO-secure for a slightly enriched distribution of programs D over P × P , without auxiliary input.
Intuitively, this transformation works by embedding the "bad auxiliary input" into the inputoutput behavior of the circuits to be obfuscated themselves. That is, the new distribution D is formed by sampling first a triple (P 0 , P 1 , z) of programs and auxiliary input from the original distribution D, and then instead considering the tweaked programs P z 0 , P z 1 that have a special additional input x * (denoted later as "mode = * ") for which P z 0 (x * ) = P z 1 (x * ) is defined to be z. This introduces no new differing inputs to the original program pair P 0 , P 1 , but now there is no hope of preventing the adversary from learning z without sacrificing correctness of the obfuscation scheme.
A technical challenge arises in the security reduction, however, in which we must modify the obfuscation of the z-embedded program P z b to "look like" an obfuscation of the original program P b . Interestingly, this issue is solved by making use of a second layer of obfuscation, and is where the iO security of the obfuscator is required. We refer the reader to Section 5 for details.
Other Applications of the "Succinct Punctured Program" Technique
As mentioned above, the "punctured program" paradigm of [SW14] has been used in multiple applications (e.g., [SW14, HSW14, GGHR, BZ14]). Many of them rely on punctured programs in an essentially identical way to the approach described above, and in particular follow the same hybrids within the security proof. Furthermore, for some of these applications, there are significant gains in making the obfuscation succinct (i.e., independent of the input size of the obfuscated program). Thus, for these applications, if we instead rely on differing-inputs obfuscation (and the existence of collision-resistant hash functions), by using our succinct punctured program technique, we can obtain significant improvements. For instance, relying on the same approach as above, we can show based on these assumptions:
• "Succinct" Perfect Zero-Knowledge Non-Interactive Universal Argument System (with communication complexity k for every ), by relying on the non-succinct Perfect NIZK construction of [SW14] .
• A universal instantiation of Random Oracles, for which the Full Domain Hash (FDH) signature paradigm [BR93] is (selectively) secure for every trapdoor (one-to-one) function (if hashing not only the message but also the index of the trapdoor function), by relying on the results of [HSW14] showing how to provide a trapdoor-function specific instantiation of the random oracle in the FDH. 7
We explore these applications further in Section 4.
Preliminaries

Differing-Inputs Obfuscation
For each distribution D = {D k } over M k × M k × {0, 1} * (specifying program pairs and auxiliary input), we define differing-inputs obfuscation secure with respect to D. We present a definition as formalized in [BCP14] , which is a variant of the notion of "differing-inputs" obfuscation of [BGI + 12]. 8
, 1} * if it satisfies the following correctness and security properties:
• Correctness: There exists a negligible function negl(k) such that for every security parameter k ∈ N, for all M ∈ M k , for all inputs x, we have
7 That is, [HSW14] shows that for every trapdoor one-to-one function, there exists some way to instantiate the random oracle so that the resulting scheme is secure. In constrast, our results shows that there exists a single instantation that works no matter what the trapdoor function is.
8 Formally, our notion of differing-inputs obfuscation departs from differing-inputs obfuscation of [BGI + 12] in three ways: First, we consider a setting in which the adversary (and extractor) may receive auxiliary input. Second, [BGI + 12] require the extractor E to extract a differing input for M0, M1 given any pair of programs M 0 , M 1 evaluating equivalent functions. Third, [BGI + 12] consider also adversaries who distinguish with negligible advantage (k), and require that extraction still succeeds in this setting, but within time polynomial in 1/ . In contrast, we restrict our attention only to adversaries who succeed with noticeable advantage.
• Security: For every non-uniform PPT adversary A and polynomial p(k), there exists a nonuniform PPT extractor E and polynomial q(k) such that for every k ∈ N, it holds with overwhelming probability over
Definition 2.2 (Differing-Inputs Obfuscator for TM). A uniform PPT machine diO TM is called a differing-inputs obfuscator for the class TM of polynomial-size Turing machines if it satisfies the following. For each k, let M k be the class of Turing machines Π containing a description of a Turing machine M of size bounded by k, such that Π takes two inputs, (t, x), with |t| = k, and the output of Π(t, x) is defined to be the the output of running the Turing machine M (x) for t steps. Then diO TM is a differing-inputs obfuscator for {M k }. 9
Extractable One-Way Functions
For this work, we consider a slightly weakened version of EOWFs w.r.t. distributional auxiliary input information, from some distribution Z. Namely, we require one-wayness and extractability to hold with overwhelming probability over auxiliary input z sampled from Z. In contrast, typical definitions require these properties to hold for any auxiliary input z in some auxiliary input set Z (e.g., all length-bounded values). For example, "standard" auxiliary-input-secure EOWFs [CD08] are required to be Z-auxiliary-input EOWFs for every (possibly non-uniform) distribution Z.
We present a non-uniform version of the definition, in which both one-wayness and extractability are with respect to non-uniform polynomial-time adversaries. 
associated with an efficient probabilistic key sampler K F , is a Z-auxiliary-input extractable one-way function if it satisfies:
• One-wayness: For non-uniform polynomial-time A and sufficiently large k ∈ N,
• Extractability: For any non-uniform polynomial-time adversary A, there exists a non-uniform polynomial-time extractor E such that, for sufficiently large security parameter k ∈ N:
9 Note that applying the properties of differing-inputs obfuscation to this class of Turing machines {M k } implies that for programs Π0, Π1 ∈ M k defined above (corresponding to underlying size-k Turing machines M0, M1), efficiently distinguishing between obfuscations of Π0 and Π1 implies that one can efficiently extract an input pair (t , x ) for which Π0(t , x ) = Π1(t , x ). In particular, either M0(x ) = M1(x ) or Runtime(M0, x ) = Runtime(M1, x). Thus, if restricting attention to a subclass of M k for which each pair of programs satisfies Runtime(M0, x) = Runtime(M1, x) for each input x, then "standard" extraction is guaranteed (i.e., such that the extracted input contains x satisfying M0(x ) = M1(x )). In the sequel, when referring to a differing-inputs obfuscation of a Turing machine M , we will implicitly mean the related program ΠM as above, but will suppress notation of the additional input t. For our application, it will be the case for the relevant class of Turing machines that every pair of programs M0, M1 has same runtime per input (and thus we will achieve "standard" input-extraction guaranteed).
Succinct Non-Interactive Arguments (SNARGs and SNARKs)
We focus attention to publicly verifiable succinct arguments.
We consider succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (SNARKs) with adaptive soundness in Section 3.2, and consider the case of specific distributional auxiliary input. Definition 2.4 (Z-Auxiliary Input Adaptive SNARK). A triple of algorithms (CRSGen, Prove, Verify) is a publicly verifiable, adaptively sound succinct non-interactive argument of knowledge (SNARK) for the relation R if the following conditions are satisfied for security parameter k:
• Completeness: For any (x, w) ∈ R,
In addition, Prove(x, w, crs) runs in time poly(k, |y|, t).
• Succinctness: The length of the proof π output by Prove(x, w, crs), as well as the running time of Verify(x, π, crs), is bounded by p(k + |X|), where p is a universal polynomial that does not depend on R. In addition, CRSGen(1 k ) runs in time poly(k): in particular, crs is of length poly(k).
• Adaptive proof of knowledge: For any non-uniform polynomial-size prover P * there exists a non-uniform polynomial-size extractor E P * , such that for all sufficiently large k ∈ N and auxiliary input z ← Z, it holds that
We also consider the following notion of zero-knowledge (ZK) succinct non-interactive arguments (SNARGs) without the extraction property, in Section 4.1.
Definition 2.5 (Perfect ZK-SNARG). A triple of algorithms (CRSGen, Prove, Verify) is a publicly verifiable perfect zero-knowledge (ZK) succinct non-interactive argument (SNARG) for the relation R (corresponding to language L) if it satisfies the Correctness and Succinctness properties as in Definition 2.4, in addition to the following properties:
• (Non-Adaptive) Soundness: For every PPT P * , for every x / ∈ L, it holds that Pr[crs ← CRSGen(1 k ); π ← P * (1 k , x, crs) : Verify(x, π, crs) = 1] ≤ negl(k).
• Perfect Zero Knowledge: There exist PPT algorithms S = (S crs , S Proof ) such that for any polynomial collection (
, the following distributions are identical:
{(crs sim , td) ← S crs (1 k ); π sim 1 ← S Proof (x 1 , crs, td); · · · ; π sim ← S Proof (x , crs, td) : (crs sim , π sim 1 , . . . , π sim )}.
Definition 2.6 ((Perfect ZK) Universal Arguments). [BG08] We say that (CRSGen, Prove, Verify) is a (perfect zero-knowledge) universal argument if it is a (Perfect ZK) SNARG for the universal relation R U , defined to be the set of instance-witness pairs (y, w), where y = (M, x, t), |w| ≤ t, and M is a Turing machine, such that M accepts (x, w) after at most t steps.
Note that while the witness w for each instance y = (M, x, t) in the relation R U is of size at most t, there is no a-priori polynomial bounding t in terms of |x|.
Puncturable PRFs
Our result makes use of puncturable PRFs, which are PRFs with an extra capability to generate keys that allow one to evaluate the function on all bit strings of a certain length, except for any polynomial-size set of inputs. We focus on the simple case of puncturing PRFs at a single point. The definition is formulated as in [SW14] , following the specific exposition of [BCPR14] . 
associated with an efficient (probabilistic) seed sampler K PRF , is a puncturable PRF if there exists a puncturing algorithm Punct that takes as input a seed s ∈ {0, 1} k and a point x * ∈ {0, 1} m (k) , and outputs a punctured seed s x * , so that the following conditions are satisfied:
• Indistinguishability at punctured points: The following ensembles are computationally indistinguishable:
Note that the definition is "selectively secure," where x * is specified before sampling the public parameters. For notational simplicity, (and without loss of generality), we will assume the punctured key s x * explicitly includes x * in the clear.
As observed in [BW13, BGI14, KPTZ13], the GGM tree-based PRF construction [GGM86] yields puncturable PRFs as defined above, based on any one-way function. The size of such a punctured key s x * in this construction is O(m (k) · (k)) (specifically, a punctured key at input x * = x 1 x 2 · · · x m (k) can be attained by providing m (k) size-(k) partial evaluations in the GGM tree, corresponding to prefixes (x 1 ), (x 1x2 ), . . . , (x 1 x 2 · · ·x m (k) ).) BGI14, KPTZ13] ). If one-way functions exist, then for all efficiently computable functions m (k) and (k), there exists a puncturable PRF family that maps m (k) bits to (k) bits, such that the size of a punctured key is O(m (k) · (k)).
Differing-Inputs Obfuscation or Extractable One-Way Functions
In this section, we present our main result: a conflict between differing-inputs obfuscation ("diO") and extractable one-way functions (EOWF) w.r.t. particular fixed distributions of auxiliary information.
From D-Distributional diO to Impossibility of Z-Auxiliary-Input EOWF
We demonstrate bounded polynomial-time uniformly samplable distributions Z (with bounded polysize output length) and D (over T M × T M × {0, 1} p(k) for bounded poly-size p(k)) such that if there exists differing-inputs obfuscation for Turing machines w.r.t. distribution D of programs and auxiliary inputs, and there exist collision-resistant hash functions (CRHF), then there do not exist extractable one-way functions (EOWF) w.r.t. auxiliary information sampled from distribution Z. In our construction, Z consists of an obfuscated Turing machine, and the auxiliary input portion of D is precisely the distribution of CRHF function descriptions. In particular, if there exist CRHFs whose indices are random (e.g., public-coin CRHFs), then the auxiliary input in D can be uniform.
We emphasize that we provide a single distribution Z of auxiliary inputs for which all candidate EOWF families F with given output length will fail. This is in contrast to the result of [BCPR14] , which show for each candidate family F that there exists a tailored distribution Z F (whose size grows with |F|) for which F will fail. 
Proof. We construct an adversary A and desired distribution Z on auxiliary inputs, such that for any alleged EOWF family F, there cannot exist an efficient extractor corresponding to A given auxiliary input from Z (assuming existence of the listed tools).
The Universal Adversary A. We consider a universal PPT adversary A that, given (i, z) ∈ {0, 1} poly(k) × {0, 1} n(k) , parses z as a Turing machine and returns z(i). Note that in our setting, i corresponds to the index of the selected function f i ∈ F, and (looking ahead) the auxiliary input z will contain an obfuscated program. 
which we now describe. We assume without loss of generality for each k that the corresponding collection of Turing machines Π h,s ∈ M k , Π h,s i,y ∈ M * k are of the same size; this can be achieved by padding. (We address the size bound of each class of machines below). In a similar fashion, we may further assume that for each k the runtime of each Π h,s and Π h,s i,y on any given input f i is equal (see discussion in Section 2.1).
At a high level, each machine Π h,s accepts as input a poly-size circuit description of a function f i (with canonical description, including a function index i), computes the hash of the corresponding index i w.r.t. the hardcoded hash function h, applies a PRF with hardcoded seed s to the hash, and then evaluates the circuit f i on the resulting PRF output value x: that is, The machines Π h,s i,y perform a similar task, except that instead of having the entire PRF seed s hardcoded, they instead only have a punctured seed s * derived from s by puncturing it at the point h(i) (i.e., enabling evaluation of the PRF on all points except h(i)). In addition, it has hardwired an output y to replace the punctured result. More specifically, on input a circuit description f j (with explicitly specified index j), the program Π h,s i,y first computes the hash h = h(j), continues computation as usual for any h = h(i) using the punctured PRF key, and for h = h(i), it skips the PRF and U k evaluation steps and directly outputs y. Note that because h is not injective, this puncturing may change the value of the program on multiple inputs f j (corresponding to functions f j ∈ F with h(j) = h(i)). When the hardcoded value y is set to y = f i (PRF s (h(i))), then Π h,s i,y agrees with Π h,s additionally on the input f i , but not necessarily on the other inputs f j for which h(j) = h(i). (Indeed, whereas the hash of their indices collide, and thus their corresponding PRF outputs, PRF(h(j)), will agree, the final step will apply different functions f j to this value). We remark that indistinguishability obfuscation arguments will thus not apply to this scenario, since we are modifying the computed functionality. In contrast, differing-inputs obfuscation will guarantee that the two obfuscated programs are indistinguishable, otherwise we can efficiently find one of the disagreeing inputs, which will correspond to a collision in the CRHF.
Note that each Π h,s i,y can be described by a Turing machine of size O(|s * | + |h| + |y| + |U k |). Recall by Theorem 2.8 the size of the punctured PRF key |s * | ∈ O(m (k) (k)), where the PRF has input and output lengths m (k) and (k). In our application, note that the input to the PRF is not the function index i itself (in which case the machine Π h,s i,y would need to grow with the size of the alleged EOWF family), but rather the hashed index h(i), which is of fixed polynomial length. Thus, collectively, we have |Π h,s i,y | is bounded by a fixed polynomial p (k), and finally that there exists a single fixed polynomial bound on the size of all programs Π h,s ∈ M, Π h,s i,y ∈ M * . This completely determines the defined auxiliary input distribution Z = {Z k }, described in full in Figure 2 . (Note that the size of the auxiliary output generated by Z, which corresponds to an obfuscation of an appropriately padded program Π h,s is thus also bounded by a fixed polynomial in k). Input: Circuit description f j (containing index j) Proof. First note that given auxiliary input z ← Z k , A produces an element in the image of the selected f i with high probability. That is,
Indeed, by the definition of A and Z k , and the correctness of the obfuscator diO, then we have with overwhelming probability
where z =M is an obfuscation of Π h,s ∈ M; i.e., z =M ← diO(Π h,s ). Now, suppose for contradiction that there exists a non-negligible function (k) such that for all k ∈ N the extractor E successfully outputs a preimage corresponding to the output A(i; z) ∈ Range(f i ) with probability (k): i.e.,
where as before, s, h are such that z = diO(Π h,s ). We show that this cannot be the case, via three steps.
Step 1: Replace Z with "punctured" distribution Z(i, y). For every index i of the EOWF family F and k ∈ N, consider an alternative distribution Z k (i, y) that, instead of sampling and obfuscating a Turing machine Π h,s from the class M, as is done for Z, it does so with a Turing machine Π h,s i,y ∈ M * as follows. First, it samples a hash function h ← H k and PRF seed s as usual. It then generates a punctured PRF key s * ← Punct(s, h(i)) that enables evaluation of the PRF on all points except the value h(i). For the specific index i, it computes the correct full evaluation y := f i (PRF s (h(i))). Finally, Z k (i, y) outputs an obfuscation of the constructed program Π h,s i,y as specified in Figure 10 from the values (h, s * , y): i.e.,M ← diO(Π h,s i,y ). See Figure 4 for a full description of Z(i, y).
We now argue that the extractor E must also succeed in extracting a preimage when given a value z * ← Z k (i, y) from this modified distribution instead of Z k . At a high level, the argument runs as follows. If E's extraction success drops by a non-negligible amount when instead given a sample from this new distribution, then he can be used to distinguish between obfuscations of corresponding pair of programs Π h,s , Π h,s i,y . By the differing-inputs obfuscation property, this implies that we can efficiently extract an input j on which the two programs differ. But, by construction, the only such inputs j are those that collide with i with respect to the collision-resistant hash function. Thus, such an extractor cannot exist, as it can be used to efficiently find collisions in the CRHF.
We now formalize this intuition.
Lemma 3.3. It holds that
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, there exists a non-negligible function α(k) for which the probability in Equation (1) is less than (k) − α(k). In particular, there exists a polynomial p(k) such that for infinitely many values of k, there exists an index i k in the range of K F (1 k ) for which
.
Denote by I = {i k } this ensemble of function indices. Consider the following non-uniform obfuscation adversary A I obf making use of E, hardcoded with the ensemble of "good" index values I, and given auxiliary input a hash function description h (note that we eventually wish to turn E into an adversary for the CRHF family). Now, expanding out the sampling procedures of the distributions Z k , Z k (i k , y), Equation (2) implies that for the hardcoded ensemble E = {i k }, it holds for infinitely many values of k that
Obfuscation adversary
where ProgSample(1 k , i k , h) is given by:
2. s * ← Punct(s, h(i k )).
3. Output M 0 := Π h,s , M 1 := Π h,s i,y . Indeed, note that if b = 0 then the obfuscated programM given to A I obf in Equation (3) is distributed asM ← Z k , in which case E extracts a preimage with probability at least (k). In contrast, if b = 1, thenM given to A E obf is distributed asM ← Z k (i k , y), in which case (for infinitely many k) E extracts a preimage with probability (k) − 1/p(k).
Thus, with probability at least 1/4p(k) over h ← H k ;
Now, by the differing-inputs obfuscation security of diO (with respect to distribution D of programs and auxiliary input corresponding to sampled Π h,s , Π h,s i,y and auxiliary input h) there exists a non-uniform PPT algorithm E I obf (with some non-uniform advice ensemble I ) and a polynomial q(k) corresponding to A I obf and p(k), such that for any pair of programs M 0 , M 1 for which A I obf successfully distinguishes between the obfuscations diO(M 0 ) and diO(M 1 ) with advantage 1/4p(k) (when given auxiliary input h ← H k ), then E I obf (given the pair M 0 , M 1 ) will extract a disagreeing input j such that M 0 (j) = M 1 (j) with non-negligible probability 1/q(k) when given the same auxiliary input h ← H k .
By (4), this means that for infinitely many k, with probability 1
We now argue that this contradicts the collision resistance of the hash family H. Namely, consider the following non-uniform PPT collision-finding adversary A I,I CR , who is given both advice ensembles I, I . By Equation (5), we have that with probability at least 1/4p(k) over the sampling of the challenge function h ← H k and A I CR 's sampling of (M 0 , M 1 ) ← ProgSample(1 k , i k , h) that the extractor E I obf succeeds in extracting a disagreeing input with probability 1/q(k). Thus, with probability 1/4p(k)q(k), the value j output by A I,I CR (1 k ) satisfies M 0 (j) = M 1 (j); that is, Π h,s (j) = Π h,s i,y (j). But, by construction of Π h,s i,y , the set of such inputs consists exactly of the values {j = i k |h(j) = h(i k )}. (Indeed, recall that for all inputs j with h(j) = h(i k ), we hardcoded their final output to the value corresponding to Π h,s (i k )). Therefore, with non-negligible probability (1/4p(k)q(k) for infinitely many k), A I,I CR has found a collision in h, yielding a contradiction to the security of H. The lemma follows.
Collision-finding adversary
Step 2: Replace "correct" hardcoded y in Z(i, y) with random f i evaluation. Next, we consider another experiment where Z k (i, y) is altered to a nearly identical distribution Z k (i, u) where, instead of hardcoding the "correct" i-evaluation value y = f i (PRF s (h(i))) in the generated "punctured" program Π h,s i,y , the distribution Z k (i, u) now simply samples a random f i output y = f i (u) for an independent random u ← {0, 1} k . We claim that the original EOWF extractor E still succeeds in finding a preimage when given this new auxiliary input distribution: Lemma 3.4. It holds that
Proof. This follows from the fact that PRF s (h(i)) is pseudorandom, even given the h(i)-punctured key s * .
Formally, consider an algorithm A 0 PRF which, on input the security parameter 1 k , a pair of values i, h, and a pair s * , x (that will eventually correspond to a challenge punctured PRF key, and either PRF s (h(i)) or random u), performs the following steps. Now, suppose Lemma 3.4 does not hold: i.e., the probability in Equation (6) differs by some nonnegligible amount from (k). Then, expanding out the sampling procedure of Z k (i, y) and Z k (i, u), we have for some non-negligible function α(k) that
where x 0 := PRF s (h(i)) and x 1 := u. Indeed, in the case b = 0, the auxiliary input z * * generated by A PRF and given to E has distribution exactly Z(i, y), whereas in the case b = 1, the generated z * * has distribution exactly Z(i, u).
In particular, there exists a polynomial p(k) such that for infinitely many k, there exists an index i k and hash function h k ∈ H k with
where x 0 , x 1 are as before. Consider a non-uniform punctured-PRF adversary A I PRF (with the ensemble I = {i k , h k } hardcoded) that first selects the challenge point h k (i k ); receives the PRF challenge information (s * , x) for this point; executes A 0 PRF on input (1 k , i k , h k , s * , x), and outputs the corresponding bit b output by A 0 PRF . Then by (8), it follows that A I PRF breaks the security of the punctured PRF.
Step 3: Such an extractor breaks one-wayness of EOWF. Finally, we observe that this means that E can be used to break the one-wayness of the original function family F. Indeed, given a random key i and a challenge output y = f i (u), an inverter can simply sample a hash function h and h(i)-punctured PRF seed s * on its own, construct the program Π h,s i,y with its challenge y hardcoded in, and sample an obfuscation z * * ← diO(Π h,s i,y ). Finally, it runs E(i, z * * ) to invert y * , with the same probability (k) − negl(k).
This concludes the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Differing-Inputs Obfuscation or SNARKs
We link the existence of differing-inputs obfuscation for N C 1 and the existence of succinct non- 3. Thus, one of these conflicting hypotheses must be false. That is, there exist efficient distributions Z , D such that assuming existence of FHE with decryption in N C 1 and collision-resistant hash functions, then either: (1) D-distributional differing-inputs obfuscation for N C 1 does not exist, or (2) SNARKS for NP w.r.t. Z do not exist.
Note that we focus on the specific case of PEOWFs with k-bit inputs and k-bit outputs, as this suffices to derive the desired contradiction; however, the theorems following extend also to the more general case of PEOWF output length (demonstrating an efficient distribution Z to rule out each potential output length (k)).
Proximity EOWFs
We begin by defining Proximity EOWFs.
Proximity Extractable One-Way Functions (PEOWFs). In a Proximity EOWF (PEOWF), the extractable function family {f i } is associated with a "proximity" equivalence relation ∼ on the range of f i , and the one-wayness and extractability properties are modified with respect to this relation. The one-wayness is strengthened: not only must it be hard to find an exact preimage of v, but it is also hard to find a preimage of any equivalent v ∼ v . The extractability requirement is weakened accordingly: the extractor does not have to output an exact preimage of v, but only a preimage of of some equivalent value v ∼ v.
As an example, consider functions of the form f :
x → (f 1 (x), f 2 (x)) and equivalence relation on range elements (a, b) ∼ (a, b ) whose first components agree. Then the proximity extraction property requires for any adversary A who outputs an image element (a, b) ∈ Range(f ) that there exists an extractor E who finds an input x for which f (x) = (a, b ) for some b not necessarily equal to b.
In this work, we allow the relation ∼ to depend on the function index i, but require that the relation ∼ is publicly (and efficiently) testable. We further consider non-uniform adversaries and extraction algorithms, and (in line with this work) auxiliary inputs coming from a specified distribution Z. 
associated with an efficient probabilistic key sampler K F , is a Z-auxiliary-input proximity extractable one-way function if it satisfies the following (strong) one-wayness, (weak) extraction, and public testability properties:
• (Strengthened) One-wayness: For non-uniform polynomial-time A and sufficiently large security parameter k ∈ N,
• (Weakened) Extractability: For any non-uniform polynomial-time adversary A, there exists a non-uniform polynomial-time extractor E such that, for sufficiently large security parameter k ∈ N,
• Publicly Testable Relation: There exists a deterministic polytime machine T such that, given the function index i, T accepts y, y ∈ {0, 1} (k) if and only if y ∼ k y .
( diO for N C 1 + FHE + SNARK ) =⇒ No Z-PEOWF
We now show that, assuming the existence of fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) with decryption in N C 1 , 10 then for some efficiently computable distributions D obf , Z SNARK , Z PEOWF , if there exist differing-inputs obfuscators w.r.t distribution D obf of N C 1 circuits and auxiliary inputs, and SNARKs w.r.t. auxiliary input Z SNARK , then there cannot exist PEOWFs w.r.t. auxiliary input Z PEOWF . This takes place in two steps. First, we remark that an identical proof to that of Theorem 3.1 rules out the existence of Zauxiliary-input proximity EOWFs in addition to standard EOWFs, based on the same assumptions: namely, assuming differing-inputs obfuscation w.r.t. D for Turing machines and collision-resistant hash functions (which are implied by FHE [IKO05] ). Indeed, assuming the existence of a PEOWF extractor E for the adversary A and auxiliary input distribution Z (who extracts a "related" preimage to the target value), the same procedure yields a PEOWF inverter who similarly extracts a "related" preimage to any challenge output. In the reduction, it is merely required that the success of E is efficiently and publicly testable (this is used to construct a distinguishing adversary for the differinginputs obfuscation scheme, in Step 1). However, this is directly implied by the public testability of the PEOWF relation ∼, as specified in Definition 3.5. Theorem 3.6. There exist efficient, uniformly samplable distributions Z, D such that, assuming the existence of collision-resistant hash functions and differing-inputs obfuscation w.r.t. D for polynomial-size Turing machines, there cannot exist (publicly testable) Z-auxiliary-input PEOWFs [BCP14] , it was shown that differing-inputs obfuscation for all polynomial-size Turing machines can be achieved by bootstrapping up from differing-inputs obfuscation for N C 1 , assuming the existence of FHE with decryption in N C 1 and SNARKs. 11 The resulting Turing machine obfuscator will be secure w.r.t. D if the underlying SNARK scheme is secure w.r.t. auxiliary input D, and the original N C 1 obfuscator is secure w.r.t. an augmented program and auxiliary input distribution D obf = D obf ||Z crs , formed by concatenating a sample from D with additional auxiliary input composed of a CRS generated for the SNARK scheme.
Putting this together with Theorem 3.6, we thus have the following corollary. 
( SNARK + CRHF ) =⇒ Z-PEOWF
As shown in [BCCT12] , Proximity EOWFs (PEOWFs) with respect to an auxiliary input distribution Z are implied by collision-resistant hash functions (CRHF) and SNARKs secure with respect to a related auxiliary input distribution. 12 Loosely, the transformation converts any collision-resistant hash function family F into a PEOWF by appending to the output of each f ∈ F a succinct SNARK argument π x that there exists a preimage x yielding output f (x). (If the Prover algorithm of the SNARK system is randomized, then the function is also modified to take an additional input, which is used as the random coins for the SNARK generation). The equivalence relation on outputs is defined by (y, π) ∼ (y , π ) if y = y (note that this relation is publicly testable). More explicitly, consider the new function family F composed of functions
where a function f crs ∈ F is sampled by first sampling a function f ← F from the original CRHF family, and then sampling a CRS for the SNARK scheme, crs ← CRSGen(1 k ). Now (as proved in [BCCT12] ), the resulting function family will be a PEOWF with respect to auxiliary input Z if the underlying SNARK system is secure with respect to an augmented auxiliary input distribution Z SNARK := (Z, Z ), formed by concatenating a sample from Z with a function index sampled from the collision-resistant hash function family F. 
Reaching a Standoff
Observe that the conclusions of Corollary 3.7 and Theorem 3.8 are in direct contradiction. Thus, it must be that one of the two sets of assumptions is false. Namely, Corollary 3.9. Assuming the existence of fully homomorphic encryption with decryption in N C 1 , there exist efficiently samplable distributions Z SNARK , D obf such that one of the following two objects cannot exist:
• SNARKs w.r.t. auxiliary input distribution Z SNARK .
• Differing-inputs obfuscation w.r.t. distribution D obf of N C 1 circuits and auxiliary input.
More explicitly, we have that Z SNARK = (Z, Z ) and D obf = D||Z crs , where Z is composed of an obfuscated program, Z consists of a randomly sampled index from a CRHF family, Z crs corresponds to a randomly sampled CRS from a SNARK system, and D||Z crs denotes concatenation of additional auxiliary input to the distribution D.
Applications of "Succinct Punctured Programs" Technique
We now demonstrate a variety of applications of our "succinct punctured programs" technique.
Perfect NIZK Universal Arguments
In [SW14] , Sahai and Waters demonstrated a construction of a Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge (NIZK) argument system with perfect zero knowledge from indistinguishability obfuscation, supporting fixed NP languages with statements (and witnesses) up to an a-priori bounded size. Using our succinct punctured programs technique, we achieve a non-interactive universal argument system, also perfectly zero knowledge, for languages and statements of unbounded polynomial size (see Definition 2.6).
Theorem 4.1. Assume the existence of auxiliary-input-secure differing-inputs obfuscation for TM and collision-resistant hash functions. Then for any constant > 0 there exists a perfect zeroknowledge universal argument system, as in Definition 2.6.
As with the construction of [SW14] , the obfuscation scheme we use must be secure with respect to a particular distribution Z consisting of a second obfuscated program. For simplicity, however, we state our result with respect to obfuscation secure against arbitrary auxiliary input.
NIZK of [SW14] . We first recall the NIZK construction of [SW14] . The system consists of two obfuscated circuits (serving as the CRS):
• A Prove circuit, which has hardcoded a PRF seed s, takes as input a statement and witness pair (x, w) and outputs the PRF evaluation PRF s (x) on x if w is a valid witness (i.e., R(x, w) = 1).
• A Verify circuit, which has hardcoded the same PRF seed s and a description of a one-way function f , takes as input a statement and alleged proof (x, π), and outputs 1 exactly if f (π) is equal to f (PRF s (x)). (The introduction of the one-way function f is not needed for correctness, but rather to argue security by use of the "punctured programs" technique).
Sahai and Waters show this scheme satisfies perfect zero knowledge and (non-adaptive) soundness assuming the obfuscation scheme used is a secure indistinguishability obfuscator with respect to arbitrary auxiliary input [SW14] . Note that here the size of the Prove and Verify circuits must grow with the size of potential statements x, thus inherently fixing an upper bound on the handled statement size at the time of CRS generation.
Succinct ZK Universal Arguments. Following our technique of succinct punctured programs, we modify the construction of [SW14] in two ways.
First, we replace the obfuscated Prove and Verify circuits (which depend on a fixed NP relation R) with obfuscated Turing machines, which can accept arbitrary polynomial-size relations as part of their input. That is, we now consider instances of the universal relation R U , as described in Definition 2.6. To obtain obfuscation of Turing machines, we use differing-inputs obfuscation in the place of indistinguishability obfuscation. On the surface, this modification almost appears to suffice for our goal. However, one problem remains: to prove soundness of the resulting scheme for an instance (M, x, t) / ∈ R U , we must argue that the obfuscated Turing machines are indistinguishable from obfuscations of corresponding (M, x, t)-punctured programs, whose size must grow with |(M, x, t)|. However, this requires the size of the obfuscated Turing machines to grow with |(M, x, t)|, thus annihilating our universality.
To solve this problem, we incorporate a second modification to the [SW14] construction, by first computing a collision-resistant hash of the input statement, and proceeding with this hashed value h(M, x, t). Now we need only that the obfuscated Prove and Verify programs are indistinguishable from an obfuscation of a program that is punctured at h(M, x, t), whose size can now be made independent of |(M, x, t)|. As in the previous section, indistinguishability of these programs will follow from the security of the differing-inputs obfuscation together with the collision resistance of h.
Formally, consider the following tools: Verify(crs, x, π): Evaluate the obfuscated programṼ ∈ crs on input ( x, π): i.e., outputṼ ( x, π).
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Perfect zero knowledge holds as the distribution of proofs can be perfectly simulated given the PRF seed s (without knowledge of any witness). The size and time complexities follow from a straightforward analysis of the programs P h,s , V h,s,f . In particular, for any input (M, x, t), the proof size is k bits (independent of |M |, t) corresponding to the output of the OWF, and verification of a proof on (M, x, t) requires only computing a hash and PRF, and not executing M .
(Non-adaptive) soundness follows an analogous sequence of hybrids as Theorem 3.1, mirroring the approach of [SW14] . Namely 
Universal Instantiation of Full-Domain Hash
The full-domain hash (FDH) signature paradigm, first proposed by Bellare and Rogaway [BR93, BR96] , provides a means of building a signature scheme from any trapdoor permutation, within the heuristic random oracle model. Specifically, a signature on a message m is generated by evaluating the random oracle at input m, and then computing the inverse of the trapdoor permutation on this value RO(m). This work has been very influential and formed the foundation for part of the PKCS#1 standard [KS98] . However, negative results in later years called into question the rigorous implications of security proofs in the random oracle model [CGH04, GK03, BBP04] , showing e.g. that for some such applications no concrete instantiation of the random oracle can yield security. In a recent work, Hohenberger, Sahai, and Waters [HSW14] presented a methodology for instantiating the random oracle that provides (selective) security for full-domain hash signatures in the standard model, building on recent advances in indistinguishability obfuscation (in particular, using the punctured programs paradigm of [SW14] ). They demonstrate for every trapdoor permutation f that there exists a hash function R f (tailored to f ) such that the FDH signature scheme is (selectively) secure in the standard model when using f and instantiating the random oracle by R f .
We show that our succinct punctured programs technique yields a universal instantiation of the random oracle providing security for full-domain hash signatures. That is, we provide a single family of Turing machines R = {R k } such that, for any injective trapdoor function f , the Bellare-Rogaway Full-Domain Hash signature scheme [BR93, BR96] using f and instantiating the random oracle by R is selectively secure in the standard model. This construction involves a tweak to the FDH signature structure, in which the random oracle takes as input a description of the trapdoor permutation f in addition to the message to be signed: i.e., Sign(m) = f −1 (RO(m, f )).
Our construction. Intuitively, to instantiate the random oracle, we would like for each message m to be able to sample a random image of a given trapdoor function f , without revealing information about the corresponding preimage. In [HSW14] , this is done by providing an (indistinguishability) obfuscation of a circuit that computes a PRF on the input m and then evaluates f on this outcome. Using the technique of punctured programs [SW14], Hohenberger et al. [HSW14] show that given this obfuscated circuit, no information is revealed about the evaluation of the PRF on the (pre-selected) forgery challenge message m, so that forging on message m implies inverting a random(-looking) output f (PRF s (m)) of the trapdoor function, contradicting its assumed security. In this construction, however, the obfuscated circuit (i.e., the instantiation of the random oracle) inherently depends on the trapdoor function f .
We avoid this dependency by obfuscating a Turing machine that takes as input a message m and description of the desired trapdoor function f (described as a poly-size circuit), and outputs a seemingly random evaluation of f . As in our constructions from the previous sections, in order to allow the size of the obfuscated program to be independent of the size of the input trapdoor function (while still maintaining security), we first hash the input (m, f ), and then proceed with this hashed value. Indeed, security of the construction will be shown by replacing the obfuscated program with a corresponding obfuscated "punctured" program, with the punctured (challenge) input and output hardcoded; this hardcoded input corresponds to a challenge pair (m, f ) in the naïve case, forcing the obfuscated program to grow in size with |f |, but is reduced to a short hashed value h(m, f ) in the latter case. Again, to provide security in this modified setting, we rely on differing-inputs obfuscation. Signature queries m with h(m , f ) = h(m, f ) can be simulated in the security reduction given the punctured PRF key; any query of the form m with h(m , f ) = h(m, f ) yields a collision in h (and thus will not occur).
More explicitly, each program R h,s ∈ R k in our random oracle instantiation is a (differinginputs) obfuscation of a program Π h,s , indexed by a PRF seed s and collision-resistant hash function h. Π h,s accepts as input a message m, and a description of the trapdoor function f (modeled as a polynomial-size circuit), and it functions by: (1) computing the hash of (m, f ) with respect to h (using a Merkle-Damgard hash tree approach), (2) applying a PRF with hardcoded seed s to this hash value, and then (3) evaluating f on the resulting PRF output value x. That is,
where U k is the universal Turing machine, and
(See Figure 9 for details). Denote by M the class of Turing machines
To prove security of the resulting FDH signature scheme, we consider a second, related class of ("punctured") Turing machines
where each Turing machine Π h,s m,y is defined as in Figure 10 . The obfuscator we use is with respect to the class of Turing machines M ∪ M * . Now, consider the instantiation of the full-domain hash signature scheme using a hash function R h,s ∈ R k in the place of a random oracle, and with an injective trapdoor function family F. Theorem 4.2. Assuming the existence of collision-resistant hash functions, and differing-inputs obfuscation for the class TM, then for any injective trapdoor function family F, the scheme described above is a selectively secure signature scheme.
Proof. The proof follows an analogous sequence of hybrids as in Theorem 3.1, mirroring the approach of [HSW14] . Namely, for challenge forgery message m and injective trapdoor function f , the hybrids are (loosely) as follows:
Hybrid 0: The real (selective) security experiment. By the indistinguishability of hybrids, it follows that a forging adversary must continue to successfully forge in this final experiment, Hybrid 2. But, this implies the adversary can invert a random output of the trapdoor function, yielding the desired contradiction.
Removing Auxiliary Input in diO
We now demonstrate that even in the absence of auxiliary input, care must be taken when making use of differing-inputs obfuscation (diO). Specifically, we observe a general transformation obtaining diO with respect to any distribution D over P × P × {0, 1} p(k) of program pairs and polynomial bounded-length auxiliary input from any O that satisfies a weaker notion of indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) security (which is not an extractability assumption; see Section 5.1 below), and is diO-secure with respect to distribution D over slightly enriched program pairs P × P , with no auxiliary input. 13 Intuitively, we demonstrate that "bad side information" cannot be avoided by disallowing auxiliary input, but rather can appear embedded within the input-output behavior of the programs to be obfuscated. Since any candidate obfuscator O must preserve the input-output functionality of the underlying programs, this "bad" information is unavoidably released.
Theorem 5.1 (Removing Auxiliary Input in diO). For any polynomial p and distribution D over P × P ×{0, 1} p(k) , there exists a polynomial q, a class of programs P with max P ∈P |P | ≤ q(max P ∈P |P |), and a distribution D over P × P for which the following holds. The existence of diO w.r.t. D (with auxiliary input) is implied by the existence of obfuscation that is iO secure and diO secure w.r.t. D (without auxiliary input).
In the following two subsections, we present a formal definition of iO, and then present our transformation and proof for Theorem 5.1.
Indistinguishability Obfuscation
We begin by defining the notion of indistinguishability obfuscation (iO), which we rely on as a tool in our transformation. Note that in general, iO is weaker than (and implied by) diO. However, in our setting, we consider general-purpose iO, versus diO that is secure with respect to a particular distribution. In such case, the two notions are incomparable. • Security: For every non-uniform PPT adversary A and polynomial p(k), for every k ∈ N, every pair of Turing machines M 0 , M 1 ∈ M k ,
Remark 5.3 (iO and Auxiliary Input). In contrast to diO obfuscation, indistinguishability obfuscation directly implies security against arbitrary auxiliary input. Indeed, for any non-uniform adversary A and auxiliary input z, we can simply consider a modified non-uniform adversary A z who has z, and the same conclusion holds. (Recall the issue in the more demanding diO setting is that one must demonstrate an extractor algorithm E for the original adversary A such that the same extractor works for any possible auxiliary input z).
diO with Auxiliary Input from iO + diO without Axuiliary Input
We now present our "auxiliary input removal" transformation, constituting the proof of Theorem 5.1. Formally, for class of programs P, and distribution D over P×P×{0, 1} p(k) , we define generic program modifiers, and then corresponding "enriched" variants P , D below. (Note that the p-notation will mostly be suppressed).
Definition 5.4 (Program Modifiers). For program class P, define the following program "wrappers":
• Expand(P, z): For P ∈ P, z ∈ {0, 1} p(k) , the program Expand(P, z) takes as input a pair (x, mode) for x a valid input to P and mode ∈ {∅, * } (corresponding to "standard" and "special" modes), and embeds z into the program input-output as follows:
to ∅ (i.e., "standard" evaluation mode). More formally, let size = |O (ztoZero(Expand(P, z)))| for P ∈ P, z ∈ {0, 1} p(k) . Then we define Security: Consider a (non-uniform) PPT adversary A and polynomial q A . To prove the theorem, we must construct an extractor algorithm E, polynomial q E , and negligible function ν, and show that for all but negligible probability ν(k) over
for these P 0 , P 1 , z, then E succeeds with probability 1/q E (k) in extracting a differing input for P 0 , P 1 , given input (1 k , P 0 , P 1 , z). Roughly we will do this in three steps: (1) We first show for any Oadversary A that distinguishes as above, there is an O -adversary that distinguishes in the diO challenge w.r.t. D with similar success (making use of the iO security of O in the process). At a high level, there are two challenges we must solve in order for A to make use of the adversary A:
• First, A must generate from his challenge O (P z b ) an appropriate value of auxiliary input z to give to A. This will be done by reading the embedded value z at the "special input" of O (P z b ). • Second (and slightly more complicated), he must convert
Indeed, it is possible that A may successfully distinguish given z and obfuscations of the latter type, yet may not succeed when given z and obfuscations of the former. In particular, note that the program O (P z b ) contains information z that agrees with the auxiliary input, whereas O(P b ) has only 0 in this role; since we make no assumptions on the structure of the obfuscator O , there is no direct way to "strip off" this extra information from the obfuscation O (P z b ). Instead, to achieve this goal, we make use of a second layer of obfuscation. Namely, given the (obfuscated) code O (P z b ) in the O challenge, we can generate a second program M 0 b that has the same input-output behavior and size as the desired underlying program pad(Expand(P b , 0), size) that appears within O in the obfuscation O(P b ). Explicitly,
(i.e., are functionally equivalent), where recall the second program bypasses the code of O (P z b ) on the special input mode = * and directly outputs 0 (see Definition 5.4). Indeed, both programs evaluate to 0 on any input of the form (x, * ) and to P b (x) on any input of the form (x, ∅).
). Note that the value of size for pad was precisely chosen to be comparable with the size of the program M 0 b (see Definition 5.4). Now, because M 0 b and pad(Expand(P b , 0), size) have identical input-output behavior (and size), by the indistinguishability obfuscation security of O (which, recall, supports auxiliary input; see Remark 5.3), it must be that their O -obfuscations are indistinguishable, even given z:
This indistinguishability must further be preserved when applying the Restrict(·, ∅) operation to both programs:
But, note that the right-hand distribution is now precisely ( 
By the diO security of O , we know that for this adversary A and polynomial 2q A , there exists an extractor E and polynomial q E such that, with all but negligible probability over (P z 0 , P z 1 ) ← D , if (11) holds, then with probability at least 1/q E (k), running the extractor (x * , mode) ← E (1 k , P z 0 , P z 1 ) succeeds in finding a differing input (x * , mode) for which P z 0 (x * ) = P z 1 (x * , mode). As the final step, we wish to construct from E a new extractor E that instead, given a tuple (1 k , P 0 , P 1 , z), outputs a differing input x * for which the programs P 0 and P 1 disagree. Define the algorithm E that, on input (1 k , P 0 , P 1 , z), constructs the programs P z 0 := Expand(P 0 , z) and P z 1 := Expand(P 1 , z), executes the original extractor algorithm E as (x * , mode) ← E (1 k , P z 0 , P z 1 ), and outputs the value x * . Since by construction, P z 0 (x, * ) = P z 1 (x, * ) = z for every value of x (corresponding to "special" input mode), it must be that the differing input (x * , mode) generated by E satisfies mode = ∅ (i.e., "standard" mode evaluation). That is, it must be that P z 0 (x * , ∅) = P z 1 (x * , ∅), which means precisely that P 0 (x * ) = P 1 (x * ). Theorem 5.1 follows.
Applying the theorem to [GGHW14] . In [GGHW14] , the authors propose a new "specialpurpose" Turing machine obfuscation assumption, and demonstrate based on this assumption a distribution of circuits and bounded-length auxiliary input for which diO cannot exist. Applying Theorem 5.1, we conclude that, assuming such special-purpose obfuscation exists, there exists a distribution of circuits that is diO-unobfuscatable for any iO obfuscator, even when no auxiliary input is present. Intuitively, their counterexample is for diO obfuscation of circuits that differ exactly on inputs corresponding to valid message-signature pairs (with respect to a secure digital signature scheme). Their "bad" auxiliary input distribution amounts to a "special" obfuscated program with side information on the signing key: the program takes as input a circuit description C, signs a hash of the circuit (to produce unique messages), and outputs the bit obtained by running C on the resulting message-signature pair. Access to this program allows an adversary to distinguish obfuscations of circuits as above, but (by their special obfuscation assumption) does not enable any efficient algorithm to extract a message-signature pair.
More formally, let H be a collision-resistant hash function family, and (Gen, Sign, Verify) a signature scheme (with keys denoted (sk, vk)). The "special-purpose" obfuscation assumption of [GGHW14] is given below, in Definition 5.7 and Conjecture 5.8. Garg et al. [GGHW14] prove the following theorem.
Theorem 5.9 ([GGHW14]). Under the special-purpose Turing machine obfuscation conjecture (Conjecture 5.8), there exists a distribution D over P/poly×P/poly×Z of circuit pairs and bounded-length auxiliary input information for which there cannot exist secure differing-inputs obfuscation.
Combining this with Theorem 5.1, we thus obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 5.10. Under the Special-Purpose TM Obfuscation Conjecture 5.8, there exists a distribution of circuit pairs D over P/poly × P/poly with respect to which no iO-secure obfuscator can be diO-secure, even in the absence of auxiliary input.
In particular, this implies that if the special-purpose obfuscator conjecture holds, then generalpurpose diO cannot exist, even without auxiliary input.
Corollary 5.11. Under the Special-Purpose TM Obfuscation Conjecture 5.8, there cannot exist diO for P/poly, even in the absence of auxiliary input.
Proof. Follows from Corollary 5.10, since any diO obfuscator for P/poly is also iO secure for P/poly and diO-secure for any efficiently samplable distribution of circuits D over P/poly × P/poly.
